The West is separating its nuclear fuel supply from Russia. The US has banned Russian enriched uranium, and every waiver ends on 1 January 2028. Russia's Rosatom controls about 43% of world enrichment capacity and supplied about 27% of US enrichment needs in 2023, so a large share of supply must be replaced within a few years.
- Hard deadline: the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act took effect on 11 August 2024, and every waiver ends by 1 January 2028.
- Russia hit back: in November 2024 Russia temporarily banned enriched uranium exports to the US, allowing only one-off licences.
- The rebuild is funded: the Act unlocked about $2.7B for US enrichment, and Urenco, Orano and Centrus are expanding.
- More enrichment means more uranium: expanding Western enrichment and running it harder (overfeeding) raises demand for natural uranium.
- Origin matters: Kazakhstan's output increasingly goes east, so US and Canadian uranium carries a security premium.
The dependency problem
The West's weakest point is not mining. It is the middle of the fuel chain, enrichment and conversion, where Russia is the largest single supplier. Rosatom has 29.1M SWU a year of enrichment capacity, 42.8% of the world's 68.1M SWU (WNA).
Global enrichment capacity (2025):
- Rosatom (Russia): 29.1M SWU, 42.8%.
- Urenco (UK, Netherlands, Germany): 17.3M SWU, 25.4%.
- CNNC (China): 13.8M SWU, 20.2%, mostly used at home.
- Orano (France): 7.5M SWU, 11.0%.
Russia and China together hold about 63% of the world's enrichment capacity. Only about 36% sits with Western suppliers.
How dependent each market is on Russia:
- United States: about 27% of enrichment services in 2023 came from Russia (Wikipedia). Before the ban, US sales were about $1B of Rosatom's roughly $2B in international enriched-uranium revenue (Bellona).
- European Union: 16% of natural uranium, 24.4% of conversion services and 22.6% of enrichment services (The Economy).
- South Korea: 32% of enriched uranium imports.
- Japan: few direct imports, but competing with everyone else for the same non-Russian supply.
US mining dependence: about 93% of the uranium delivered to US reactors in 2025 came from abroad: Canada 32%, Kazakhstan 28%, Australia 15% and others 18% (EIA).
The policy response
Both the US and the EU are now cutting Russia out of the nuclear fuel chain by law, and Russia has answered with its own restrictions.
United States: a ban with a firm end date
- 13 May 2024: the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act is signed (Wikipedia).
- 11 August 2024: the ban takes effect. The Department of Energy can grant waivers only where there is no viable alternative source or imports are in the national interest.
- 2024–2027: import volumes allowed under waivers shrink each year.
- 1 January 2028: all waivers end, and the ban becomes absolute.
- Funding: the Act unlocked about $2.7B of previously allocated money for domestic enrichment.
Russia: retaliation
- 15 November 2024: Russia temporarily bans enriched uranium exports to the US, with one-time licences possible as exceptions. Uranium prices rose $4.10 to $82.25/lb on the news (S&P Global).
- Ongoing: Putin has floated restricting exports of uranium, titanium and nickel more broadly.
European Union: phasing Russia out
- 6 May 2025: the REPowerEU roadmap calls for trade measures to make Russian enriched uranium "economically less viable" (EUR-Lex).
- New contracts: the Euratom Supply Agency will stop co-signing new or extended supply contracts with Russian suppliers after a set date.
- National plans: member states must set timelines to replace Russian uranium, conversion and enrichment.
- Starting point: Russia supplied about 14% of EU uranium, 23% of conversion and 24% of enrichment in 2024.
Rebuilding the Western fuel chain
Western enrichers are adding capacity, but the new plants arrive between 2028 and 2032. Until then the market stays tight (WNA).
- Urenco, Eunice, New Mexico: adding 700k SWU a year to its existing 4.3M SWU plant, with the first new cascade online in May 2025. A second phase adds 2.1M SWU, with first production in 2032.
- Orano, Georges Besse II, France: a 2.5M SWU expansion. The first new modules start in 2028, with full commissioning in 2030.
- Orano, Oak Ridge, Tennessee: a new US enrichment plant. The Department of Energy awarded $900M toward it in January 2026.
- Centrus, Piketon, Ohio: the HALEU demonstration produced more than 1,900 kg, finishing in June 2026. The Department of Energy then awarded $900M toward commercial-scale HALEU production, starting at 12 tonnes a year.
Why this raises uranium demand:
- Overfeeding: when enrichment capacity is tight relative to demand, enrichers use more natural uranium to produce the same enriched product, which raises demand for raw pounds.
- Less underfeeding: after Fukushima, spare enrichment capacity was used to strip extra uranium from feed and sell it, adding to supply. With Russia removed from Western supply, that spare capacity is gone.
- HALEU: fuel for advanced reactors needs several times more natural uranium per kilogram than conventional reactor fuel.
Kazakhstan and the pull from China
The world's largest producer is moving closer to China, so Western buyers can count on less of its output. Kazakhstan mines about 39% of the world's uranium, and its supply to the West depends on routes and partners that lie mostly outside Western control.
- Russian stakes passing to China: in December 2024, Rosatom's Uranium One sold its 49.98% stake in the Zarechnoye mine to a company owned by China's State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Company (RFE/RL).
- Sanctions friction: Kazatomprom's chief said sanctions on Russia "made it difficult to sell uranium to Western buyers" from Russian-linked joint ventures.
- Transport risk: much Kazakh uranium historically moved through Russia to St. Petersburg. The alternative Trans-Caspian route has less capacity and costs more.
- Production limits: as covered in Driver 2, Kazatomprom cut its nominal 2026 capacity from 85M to 77M lbs and has a history of downward guidance revisions.
- China's appetite: China is building about half of the world's new reactors and is locking up Central Asian supply to feed them.
Bottom line: a growing share of the largest producer's output is committed to Eastern buyers, so Western utilities have to look to Canada, the US and Australia.
US domestic uranium
US production is recovering from near zero, but it still covers only a small fraction of what US reactors buy. Washington is using trade, permitting and funding tools to close that gap.
- Production is up: US mines produced 2.1M lbs U3O8 in 2025, more than triple 2024 and the most since 2017 (EIA).
- But demand is far larger: US reactor operators bought 46.9M lbs in 2025, and about 93% of deliveries came from abroad. Domestic output covers under 5% of annual purchases.
- Prices are still rising: utilities paid a weighted average of $58.46/lb in 2025, up 11% from 2024. Long-term contracts lag spot and term prices.
- Critical mineral status: uranium was added to the US critical minerals list (60 minerals) on 10 November 2025 (Investing News). That opens access to FAST-41 expedited permitting, federal grants, loans and tax credits.
- Section 232: on 15 January 2026 the administration concluded its critical minerals investigation, explicitly including uranium. Instead of immediate tariffs, it ordered negotiations on price floors, offtake agreements and investment in US projects, reserving the option of tariffs or minimum import prices if talks fail (Covington).
The gap is the opportunity: taking US mine supply from 2M lbs toward the roughly 47M lbs US reactors buy each year would take many new mines. Every one of them is a candidate for federal support.
Risks and counterpoints
The energy security trade depends on policy staying in place. Investors should weigh:
- Waivers extended or ban softened: a geopolitical deal with Russia could reopen imports. Mitigant: the 2028 end date is in law, Russia's own counter-ban stands, and the EU is moving the same way.
- Russian material relabelled: Russian uranium could reach the West through third countries. Mitigant: the US Act and EU contract rules target origin, and utilities are applying stricter origin checks.
- Enrichment bottleneck, not uranium: the real shortage may be in enrichment, not mining. Mitigant: tight enrichment pushes enrichers to overfeed, which increases demand for natural uranium.
- Canada and Australia fill the gap: existing allied producers could meet most new Western demand. Mitigant: they are already contracted heavily, and US policy explicitly favours domestic production for national security.
- Policy cycles: the next administration could cool on critical minerals support. Mitigant: the Russian ban passed with bipartisan support, and nuclear now has backing across the political spectrum.
Investment implications
Where uranium comes from is now part of its price. US uranium has moved from a commodity to a strategic asset.
- A two-tier market is forming. Uranium from secure jurisdictions (the US, Canada, Australia) is set to earn a premium over material with Russian or Chinese exposure.
- Policy now favours US producers. Critical mineral status, FAST-41 permitting, federal financing and possible Section 232 price floors or offtake deals all benefit US projects.
- There is a lot of room to grow. US mines supply about 2M lbs a year against about 47M lbs of US reactor purchases.
- The 2028 deadline creates urgency. Utilities must replace Russian supply within about 15 months, which supports term contracting with Western suppliers now.
- Western enrichment expansion pulls on natural uranium. New Western enrichment capacity, plus overfeeding while it is tight, increases demand for natural uranium.
This report is for information only and is not investment advice. Forward-looking figures are estimates drawn from third-party sources and our own calculations.
Sources